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ABSTRACT
People have different motivation for having a paid job, and this might came from
different expectation, value and also gender roles. However, most analysis of earning
determinant has neglected this possibility. Using data from Household, Income and
Labour Dynamics (HILDA)
3 in Australia in 2001 and 2004, this paper investigates the
structure of human capital earning equation and its stability after controlling for
earning motivation. The results suggest thatsome measure of earning motivation have
effects. However, even after controlling for earning motivation, the returns to
schooling and experience do not change significantly. This suggests that the
conventional earning function is stable and robust with respect to the influences of
earning motivation.
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1. Introduction
In analysis of wage and incomedeterminant, return to schooling is mostly the focus of
attention, since it will affect individual decision on education investment and
participation. In the search of the magnitude of returns to schooling, Mincer (1974)
proposed an earning function based on the human capital theory that later become
widely accepted and used. Nevertheless, this conventional earning function implicitly
assumed that investment in human capital in terms of education attainment is decided
based on the expectedmonetary value, the wage that received by individual. It ignores
the fact that earning is not the sole motivation for individual to invest in education and
engage in work. It most likely true that motivation will determine people productivity
and hence the money they earn. We would expect that highly motivated people are
expected to have higher wage. However, other highly motivated and educated people
would not mind getting lower wage as long as they can have flexible time, have a job
that can help others or even just to have high job security.
Potential bias is likely to occur from the exclusion of earning motivation in estimating
the return to schooling. However, most of return to schooling studies focused more on
solving potential ability bias rather than potential motivation bias. This phenomenon
is likely due to the availability of several measures of ability, such as test score, IQ,
knowledge of the world of work (KWW), etc. that can be used as proxies of ability
while there is limited to none information related to worker motivation. The limitation
and weakness of using a measure of ability as proxy for ability trigger abundant
studies using another approach such as instrumental variables (for example; Levin
and Plug, 1999; Leigh and Ryan, 2005) and using sample of twins and siblings
(Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994, Miller, et al, 2006).Then the question is: will the earning function and return to schooling still stable if we
control for earning motivation of workers? Recent studies by Swaffield, 2000 and
Chevalier, 2004 emphasize the importance of incorporating worker motivation as
wage determinant. Using data on UK graduates, Chevalier (2004) found that 44
percent of gender wage differential is due to motivation and expectation. Similarly,
Swaffield (2000) suggests that female wage is affected significantly by labour market
motivation and argues that the impact ‘is driven by permanent than the transitory
component’.
In Australia, return to schooling has been analysed using a large sample of twins
(Miller, Mulvey and Martin, 1995, 2006), using different instrumental variables
(Rummery, Vella and Verbeek, 1999; Leigh and Ryan, 2005), but has not been
estimated by controlling for earning motivation. This study will tackle the problem by
using different measure of earning motivation: earning motivation that is triggered by
perception on gender roles and earning motivation that come from current job and
career expectation. In addition, this study also adopts an IV approach that relies
family dependent instrument, that include number of sibling and whether a person is
the oldest child as instruments for schooling, which also has not been done for
Australian case.
This paper proceeds in the following way. Following the introduction, section 2
presents theoretical background and review literature on the return to schooling.
Econometric model for earning function is then derived and modified to incorporate
earning motivation and will be discussed at section 3, while section 4 will focus on
some issues related to data used in this paper. Discussion about the estimation results
and its interpretation is presented in section 5, followed by shortcoming and future
research in section 6. The paper is concluded in section 7.2. Literature Review
Human capital model and Screening model are often used to explain the relationship
between education and wage. Although both model suggest that education is
positively associated with wages, but the argument behind it is very different. Human
capital model suggests that education will provide information and skills that could be
very useful in the future. Individual will invest in education through schooling to gain
skill and productivity that can be ‘rented out’ to employers (Ehrenberg and Smith,
2005). In line with this view, Rosenzweig (1995) argue that schooling may also boost
productivity by improving access to sources of information such as instruction
manuals or by enhancing the ability to interpret and understand new information. As
productivity increases, the hourly wage is expected to increase as well. On the other
hand, the screening model suggests that education does not necessarily increase
productivity, but merely signal one’s inherent productivity. So, a person with
inherently high productivity/ability will get more schooling merely because it enables
them to signal their inherent productivity. This also explains why the average self
employed individuals have less schooling that average employee, because they do not
really need to signal their inherent productivity. However, by surveying empirical
evidence that support both model, Quiggin (1995) concluded that empirical evidence
strongly support human capital model while ‘screening model generally not supported
by empirical test, except where they coincide with those of the human capital model’
A further question about the relation of education and wage is then, how much is the
return to schooling? Many methodologies have been proposed to answer this question,
but one that becomes a cornerstone in this empirical research is human capital earning
function that is proposed by Mincer (1974) that reveal how wages related to schooling
and work experience. However, the model is not flawless. It still suffers from somepotential bias, especially to individual-specific productivity component that is not
reflected in the usual human capital measures (Blackburn and Neumark, 1995). This
ability and motivation component may be correlated with both wages and schooling
that makes the OLS estimates may bias upwards and downwards.
Many research have try to deal with ability bias by using different approach such as:
using twin data and exploiting the difference in wage and education between twins
(Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Miller, et al, 2006) and using explicit proxy variable
for ability such as test score, IQ and KWW. Another approach that is widely used is
instrumental variable method. However a valid instrument is difficult to find.
Furhermore, Ichino and Ebner (1999) argue that the return of schooling are
heterogenous in population andhighly depend on instrument used.
Another individual-specific productivity component that might cause a potential bias
but has not been treated appropriately is motivation. Most of the previous research
implicitly assumes that money is the sole objective of human capital investment. In
fact, people have different motivation that will definitely determine individual effort
and expectation in their job. Only few research that accommodate motivation in their
analysis of wage and education, but the finding is evident. For example, Chevalier
(2004) based on data of UK graduates argue that gender stereotypes are evident where
‘women tend to be more altruistic and less career oriented than man’ and suggests that
women expectation about childrearing affect their wage and career. Swaffield (2000)
strengthen this view and argue that labour market motivation is a permanent
component that affect female wage significantly.3. Econometric Model and Specification
The main theory for econometric specification of this study is based on human-capital
earning function proposed by Mincer (1974), which focus on relationship between
observed earnings, potential earning and human capital investment. Investment in
human capital usually represented by formal schooling and on post-school investment
pattern which measured by years of schooling and experience respectively.
The human capital earning function was developed as follows
4. Let Ej be gross
earning at time j, Cj-1 be the investment expenditure in period t-1 and kj be the ratio of
investment to gross earning in period j. Rate of return on investment in human capital
is by r. Then we have:
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Separating formal schooling and post-school experience and assume rate of return on
investment in human capital is constant over each period, during and after schooling
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Mincer (1974) further assume that post-school investment is decline over time and
can be approximated by including quadratic terms of experience. Quadratic form of
4The derivation is closely follow Mincer (1974)experience is used as a proxy to capture depreciation of human capital over time and
also reduced investment in later life due to increasing opportunity cost and less time
to enjoy returns on any human capital investment as age increases (Preston, 1997).
Therefore, we have earning function that has a standard linear and quadratic term in
years of experience and linear term in years of schooling.
2
0 1 2 3 ln i i i i i wage YOS Exper Exper X u            (5)
where wage is hourly wage, YOS is years of schooling and Exper and Exper
2 is actual
experience in labour market measured by time spent in paid work and its square term.
X is a vector of control variables for individual characteristic which includes dummy
forstates, union membership, marital status and health status
Following the existing literature, β 1 could be described as rate of return to an
additional year of formal education or schooling. The coefficient of β 1 will possibly
be biased if earning motivation and ability is not included in earning function. The
bias will be more severe the higher correlation between education and motivation and
ability(Ashenfelter, et al., 1999).
As stated in previous section, individual motivation and attitudes toward paid job will
most likely affect their productivity and hence their wage. To overcome this potential
bias, I will use proxy for earning motivation. Following the above argument, the more
formal representation of the model can be sketched as follows:
2
0 1 2 3 ln i i i i i wage YOS Exper Exper X M u              (6)
where M is the vectors of earning motivation.
Potential bias from ability might still be a problem even though we already controlled
for earning motivation. To tackle this problem proxy for ability will also be used. So,
the modelwill be:2
0 1 2 3 ln i i i i i wage YOS Exper Exper X M A u                (7)
where M is the vectors of earning motivation and A is the vectors of ability.
Another solution to the omitted ability bias problem is to instrument for years of
education. A valid instrumental variable must meet two conditions: it must be
correlated with years of schooling, and it must be uncorrelated with wage. Various
instruments have been used in this line of literature. The usual instruments use in
explaining return to schooling includes: quarter or month of birth (Angrist and
Krueger, 1991; Leigh and Ryan, 2005), family dependent instrument, such as
sibling’s sex, number of sibling (Butcher and Case 1994; Levin and Plug 1999), and
rank-order instrument (Rummery et al 1999).
Following Levin and Plug (1999), number of sibling and sibling rank is used as
instrument variable in this paper. However, since HILDA does not provide
information about number of younger and older siblings or order of birth, I use
dummy for oldest child instead for our instrumental variables.Numbers of sibling and
birth order are expected to affect schooling due to several reasons. Levin and Plug
(1999) suggest that since there might be a constraint in income, as number of siblings
gets larger the allocation of education fund for each child likely to be affected
negatively. There also possibility that first born or oldest child is given more
allocation for education fund. Following the above argument, the more formal
representation of the model can be sketched as follows:
The first-stage equation is:
(number of sibling) (oldest child) i i i i i YOS Z           (8)
where Z includes Exper, Exper
2, X and M.The second-stage equation is
2
0 1 2 3 ln i i i i i wage YOS Exper Exper X M u              (9)
In general, a positive relationship between years of schooling and wage is expected,
while I would expect a positive with a decreasing rate relationship between labour
market experience and wage. I also expect being a union member, a married person
and person with no health problem in average has higher wage than a non-union
member, a single person and person with health problem, respectively.
4. Data
The empirical evidence is based data set from Household, Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) that is managed by Melbourne Institute of Applied
Economics and Social Research (MIAESR) and funded by the Commonwealth
Department of Family and Community Service (FaCS). HILDA is a very
comprehensive and relatively recent survey on household and labour situation which
covered very detailed information on household structure, family background,
education, past and present employment and income, job search activity, satisfaction,
health, etc. In addition HILDA has different module each year that focus on specific
issues such as family background and personal history variables in 2001 (wave 1) and
private health insurance, and youth in 2004 (wave 4). This empirical study uses data
from wave 1 and wave 4, that specifically contain information about earning
motivation and attitudes toward paid job, which involves 13,696 and 12,408 people
respectively.
For the purpose of this study, the sample is limited to full time employee that has
positive hourly wage. Full time employee is defined as those who work from 35 hours
and above per week. Hourly wage is obtained from imputed weekly gross wages andsalary from all jobs divided by hours per week usually worked in all jobs. Finally I
drop individuals with missing value on the variables of interest. This leaves us with a
sample of 3705 from wave 1 and 1136 from wave 4.
HILDA does not provide information for years of schooling directly, so it has to be
constructed using information on highest educational level attained and highest year
of school completed or currently attending. Those who finished primary school are
assigned 7 years of schooling, except for those who live in New South Wales,
Victoria, Tasmania and ACT which is assigned 6 years of schooling. Those currently
attending or have completed secondary school assigned accordingly. Individuals with
certificates as the highest level of education achieved are all treated the same and
given 13 years of schooling, while those with advanced diploma or a diploma are
assigned 14 years. Individuals with graduate diplomas and bachelor’s degrees as the
highest levels are assigned 17 and 16 years respectively. Respondents who have post-
graduate qualification, master or doctorate, are assigned 18 years of schooling. By
using this definition, some respondents are penalized especially those who has more
than one degree at the same education level. Doctorate graduates are also penalized
and given the same years of education as master graduates.
Additional variables are employed to control for other individual characteristic. The
control variables include union membership, marital status and health condition.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables. We could see from table 1
that although average years of schooling and health condition are relatively the same
for wave 1 and wave 4, the average labour market experience and percentage of
married people in wave 4 is significantly lower because its only account for young
people aged between 15 to 29 years.Table 1. Statistical Characteristics of main variables






Hourly wage ($) 21.478 18.064 18.90*** 17.318 17.175 0.83
(11.006) (6.786) (6.761) (5.995)
Years of schooling 13.172 13.392 -1.64*** 12.845 13.582 -5.43***
(2.457) (2.686) (2.029) (2.119)
Experience 21.148 17.464 21.09*** 5.441 5.333 2.03
(11.080) (10.067) (3.319) (3.202)
Potential Experience 20.975 19.700 6.47*** 5.823 5.227 11.40***
(10.796) (11.542) (3.153) (3.198)
Union member 0.361 0.364 -0.74 0.217 0.209 4.02
No Health Problem 0.882 0.895 -1.38 0.902 0.906 -0.40
Married 0.635 0.479 32.53*** 0.182 0.206 -11.63
Number of sibling 2.811 2.914 3.53 2.186 2.285 4.33
Oldest 0.357 0.345 3.48 0.370 0.337 9.79
Observations 2283 1422 543 383
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Differences are calculated with respect to female
(i.e (Xmale-Xfemale)/ Xfemale). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively
Measure of earning motivation.
HILDA is a unique datasets as it include information about earning motivation and
attitude toward paid job, which is seldom seen in other data set. In wave 1, we could
extract information about earning motivation that associated with individual
perception on gender roles. The information is obtained from selected question, using
answer coded on a 7 point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), from
self completed questionnaire on gender roles and attitudes towards paid work. In
general the answer distribution of male and female are different, except for question
on woman’s most important role in life is still that of being a mother despite the career she
may have. The distribution of answer to these earning motivation questions are
reported in table A1.On the other hand, since the focus of HILDA survey in wave 4 is on youth issue, the
measure of earning motivation is available only for young people. The measurement
is constructed based on perception on current job and employment career
expectations. The answer is coded on an 11 point scale from not all important (0) to
very important (10) is used for those questions. Male seem to care more on career and
money that they will get in the age of 35 than woman, while woman seems to care
more about job that will enable them to balance between family and work, flexibility
of time and job that they can enjoy. The distribution of answer to these earning
motivation questions are reported in table A2 and A3 in the appendix.
5. EstimationResults and Diagnostic Testing
This section will presents and analyze the estimation results of the proposed model
and followed by diagnostic test. Since we have two separate cross-sectional data,
Ordinary Least Squares will be employed to estimate model represented in equation 5
to equation 8, while equation 9 will be estimated using instrumental variables.
5.1 Results and interpretation
We begin by estimating basic earning function using OLS without incorporating
earning motivation and ability. Four additional choice variables are included in this
basic equation: whether respondent is a union member, married, has no health
problem and also states dummies. In this specification, the returns to an additional
year of education are 6.5% for male and 5.5% for female in wave 1, while for young
respondent aged below 30 in 2004 the return to an additional year of formal education
or schooling are relative higher at more than 7% for both male and female. Theseresults comparable to previously reported for Australia. Miller, et al. (2004) found
return to schooling for twin is also around 6 percent.
Table 2. OLS results for conventional earning function.
WAVE 1 (2001) WAVE 4 (2004)
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (a) (b)
Years of schooling 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.075*** 0.071***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Experience 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.107*** 0.097***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018)
Experience_Squared/100 -0.038*** -0.054*** -0.526*** -0.472***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.130) (0.141)
Union member 0.092*** 0.065*** 0.115*** 0.092***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.034) (0.031)
No health problem 0.119*** 0.096** 0.095* -0.022
(0.031) (0.039) (0.057) (0.045)
Married 0.061*** 0.005 0.015 0.030
(0.020) (0.021) (0.040) (0.038)
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2,283 1,422 543 383
R-squared 0.211 0.211 0.349 0.401
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Results presented in table 2 also show that wage increase with experience at a
diminishing rate, as expected by the theory. In 2001, an additional year of experience,
evaluated at 10 years of experience, increased the wage of male by 1.63 percent while
the female wage increase by 1.75 percent. In contrast, the return from experience in
20004 is much lower at around 0.2 percent for both male and female. This is due to
our sample in 2004 is limited only for young people. Furthermore, from the result we
could infer that in 2001 male individual could achieve his maximum wage at 31.3
years of experience, while woman at 26.3 years of exprience
5.










Therefore we have wage maximizing experience: Exper = β 1/ 2 β 2.As for the control variables, union membership has positive significant effect for all
groups in both years, where union member in average has 6.5% to 11.5 % higher than
non union member, holding other variables constant. People with no health problem
on average has higher wage, except for female in 2004 which is indifference in wage
with female with heath problem. Regarding marital status, the wage in average is
higher for married man in 2001, but the same for young people in 2004.
We now focus on estimation of this model by controlling earning motivation and
ability. As I note previously, the conventional earning function will likely have
omitted variable bias if earning motivation is not included in the equation. Proxies for
earning motivation is then created and included in the conventional earning function.
For wave 1, gender roles and selected attitude towards paid job is used as proxies for
earning motivation while information on importance of career and money and
employment career expectations are used as proxies for earning motivation for young
person in wave 4. In addition, I also try to minimize potential bias that might arise
from omitted ability bias by employing individual perception on complexity and
difficulty of their job and perception on skill and ability necessary to do their job as
proxy for ability.
The regression results for 2001 in table 3 indicates that the returns to an additional
year of education for male and female in 2001 only decrease slightly by around 5
percent after controlling for earning motivation (column 3 and 6). However, it
decreasesby 17 percent for male and 18.2 percent for female if we use both proxies of
motivation and ability (column 4 and 7). This suggests that conventional earning
function might over predict the return to education as predicted.Table 3 Estimation results for Wave 1 (2001)
M a l e F e m a l e
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years of schooling 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.116* 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.131
Experience 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.031**
Experience_Squared/100 -0.037***-0.034*** -0.031** -0.052***-0.050*** -0.054**
Union member 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.065*** 0.056*** -0.031
No health problem 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.109*** 0.098** 0.099** 0.103**
Married 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.031 0.008 0.008 0.006
Have a paying job 0.007 0.008 0.017* 0.002 0.002 0.009
Job no money -0.003 -0.005 -0.011 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008
Mothers:no money no work -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 0.008
Father role -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 0.004 0.007 0.030*
Mother role -0.002 -0.003 0.005 -0.015 -0.015 -0.026*
Father earn -0.012** -0.011* -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 0.010
Mother earn -0.010 -0.012* -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006
Job is complex and difficult 0.035*** 0.031***
Useskills & abilities in job 0.007 -0.004
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2,283 2,283 2,283 1,422 1,422 1,422
R-squared 0.218 0.235 0.216 0.231
Instruments test result
F-test on excluded instruments 18.850*** 15.740***
Hansen J statistic 1.725 6.180**
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% respectively. Results are from modified earning function: after controlling for earning motivation
[Column (2) and (4)], after controlling for earning motivation and ability [column (3) and (5)] and using
instrumental variable [column (4) and (6)].
Earning motivation that arises from perspective of gender roles found to be
significantly affected male wage, but not female. This might be caused by work
interruption that likely happen to female than male
6. The importance of having a paid
job is has a positive sign as expected although not statistically significant.
Surprisingly, for a person who strongly agree that it is better for every one if man earn
money and woman take care home and children (father earn) the average wage is
lower by around 8.2 percent than male that strongly disagree
7. One possible
6A lot of studies limit their sample only to male to avoid this complication.
7, (5)Change in wage is calculated by changing father earn (compex and difficult) from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree)explanation is that people who likely to disagree has higher education and wage and
has more tolerance for working woman.
As proxy for ability, individual perception on job complexity and difficulty has
positive and statistically significant impact on wage as expected. Individual that
strongly agree that they have difficult and complex job has an average wage around
20 – 24 higher than those who think that their job is easy and simple (answering
strongly disagree to the question)
5.
Similarly to the results for wave 1 (2001), earning motivation is also found to be
jointly significant affected male wage, but not female even the sample is young
people only. In this regard, Chevalier (2004) argue that women motivation and
expectation, especially on childrearing and career expectation, will affect wages and
career early from beginning of their career. Nevertheless I still find some component
of earning motivation that significantly affect female wage. Female financial
motivation, which is represent by making a lot of money now and at age 35, is
significantly affected wage in 10 percent significant level. A female put more concern
to make a lot of money now (at 35) is gaining higher (lower) wage, ceteris paribus. As
for man, perception on career at age of 35 has a negative significant impact while
perception on making a lot of money now has a positive significant impact on wage.
One possible explanation is to have better career at the age 35, man willing to be paid
lower wage that might be related with period of training or additional formal
education.Table 4. Estimation results for Wave 4 (2004)
M a l e F e m a l e
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
(2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
Years of schooling 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.151* 0.070*** 0.067*** -0.107
Experience 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.172**
Experience_Squared/100 -0.492***-0.495*** -0.392** -0.433***-0.430***-1.119**
Union member 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.134*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.241*
No health problem 0.131** 0.134** 0.133** -0.022 -0.016 0.054
Married 0.026 0.026 -0.030 0.025 0.030 0.188
Succesful career (now) 0.016* 0.016* 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.039
Succesful career (35) -0.034***-0.034***-0.038*** 0.010 0.011 0.002
Make a lot of money (now) 0.026** 0.026** 0.042** 0.023* 0.024** 0.026
Make a lot of money (35) 0.011 0.012 0.011 -0.022* -0.022* -0.030
Job you enjoy 0.017 0.020 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.038
Job help others -0.028***-0.028*** -0.022** -0.021** -0.020** -0.026*
High status/prestigious 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.004
Job security -0.034***-0.035*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.057
Balance work and family 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.015
Control over time -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.011 -0.007
Job is complex and difficult 0.016 0.014
Use many of my skills &
abilities in my job -0.019* -0.002
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 543 543 543 383 383 383
R-squared 0.404 0.410 0.433 0.436
Instruments test result
F-test on excluded instruments 3.967** 1.266
Hansen J statistic 1.086 0.036
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively. Results are from modified earning function: after controlling for earning
motivation [Column (2) and (4)], after controlling for earning motivation and ability [column (3) and
(5)] and using instrumental variable [column (4) and (6)].
One interesting finding on earning motivation is related on people expectation on job
that can help other. The effects of this variable are significant for both male and
female and have a negative sign, which mean that ‘nice people getting punished’.
People that really want the job that can help other (with the variable score of 10) will
have around 28 percent lower wage than people that does not want the job that help
other (with the variable score of 0).As proxy for ability, individual perception on job complexity and difficulty does not
jointly significant affecting wage for both male and female. This arise a concern about
the robustness of these variables as a proxy for ability. Therefore, I also employ an
instrumental variables technique to tackle the omitted ability bias. Number of sibling
and dummy for oldest child are used for the instruments. Instrumental variable
regression results are shown in columns 5 and 8 of table 3 for 2001 and columns d
and h of table 4 for 2004. Surprisingly, the returns to schooling are now around twice
as large as the conventional earning function and still have statistically positive
significant impact, except for female sample in 2004 where the return to schooling
change sign but not statistically significant even at 10 percent of significance.
However, before we jump into conclusion, we should test for validity of the
instruments
A valid instrumental variable for this study must meet two conditions: it must be
correlated with years of schooling, and it must be uncorrelated with wage. To test the
first condition, we could use F-test on excluded instrument which is a joint
significance test for the instruments used in the first stage equation. Test for the
second condition requires over-identified condition. Since our IV model is
overidentified, Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions could be performed
to check the validity of instruments. Basically the purpose this test is to see whether
the instrument variable (number of siblings when grown-up and dummy for oldest
people) have any direct influence on wage or correlated with error term. The results
from this exercise can be seen in at the lower part of column 5 and 8 of table 3 and
columns e and h of table 4. We could see that for male performs well. The
instruments are significantly correlated with years of schooling as shown by high F
statistics of excluded instruments for both years. In addition, Hansen J statictics forthe instruments shows that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error. However,
for female sample the instrument does not pass the validity test. It correlated with
error in wave 4 regression, which possibly make the sign of years of schooling to be
negative, and it does not correlated with years of schooling in wave 1. These results
suggest that the instruments used is not quite satisfactory for female sample, but valid
for male sample.
Focusing on the male sample, the results of instrumental variables method show that
the returns to schooling are much higher than OLS estimates, which suggests that
OLS estimates are under predict and biased downward. This results contradicts with
another Australian study from Leigh and Ryan (2005) and Miller et al (2006) which
suggest that the OLS is biased upwards. Leigh and Ryan instrumenting schooling
with two sets of instruments, month of birth and changes in school leaving laws,
while Miller et al using IV with twin pair fixed effect in estimating the return to
schooling. These contradiction emphasize that the return to schooling is highly
depend on instrument used and therefore we should be more careful in
implementation of instrumental variables in this case.
In addition to rate of return from an additional year of education, rate of return of
different education degree is also analyzed. From regression results in table 5, we
could infer that in general people that have higher education degree associated with
higher wage. On average a postgraduate earns 31.5 to 48.1 percent higher, a person
with bachelor-degree earns 27 to 46 percent more and a diploma holder earns 13 to 31
percent more than people with 11 years of education or less. Holding a certificates
degree gives different impact for male and female. While certificate degree is not
statistically significant for a female to earn more than female with 11 years ofeducation or less, male with certificates degree earns around 7 to 11 percent higher
than male who did not finish secondary school. Nevertheless, if compared to a
secondary school graduate the difference is slightly smaller. This might happen
because I group all different certificate holders as one group.
Table 5. Estimation results for using educational level dummy
Conventional Earning Equation Controlled for Mobility and Ability
WAVE 1 WAVE 4 WAVE 1 WAVE 4
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post Graduate: 0.481*** 0.387*** 0.442*** 0.380*** 0.403*** 0.315*** 0.434*** 0.358***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.095) (0.092) (0.035) (0.035) (0.084) (0.095)
Bachelor 0.421*** 0.326*** 0.461*** 0.443*** 0.358*** 0.271*** 0.435*** 0.406***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.047) (0.069) (0.033) (0.035) (0.050) (0.075)
Diploma 0.235*** 0.173*** 0.289*** 0.272*** 0.182*** 0.132*** 0.292*** 0.241***
(0.043) (0.035) (0.046) (0.082) (0.042) (0.035) (0.049) (0.085)
Cert I, II, III, IV& etc 0.093*** 0.010 0.096** 0.125* 0.068*** -0.007 0.109** 0.105
(0.022) (0.033) (0.043) (0.072) (0.022) (0.033) (0.045) (0.077)
Year 12 0.157*** 0.072** 0.106** 0.156** 0.136*** 0.056* 0.115*** 0.122*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.065) (0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.069)
Experience 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.112*** 0.098*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.107*** 0.094***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.004) (0.018) (0.019)
Experience
2/100 -0.044*** -0.056*** -0.524*** -0.496*** -0.039*** -0.052*** -0.487*** -0.456***
(6.8E-5) (8.6E-5) (1.3E-3) (1.4E-3) (6.8E-5) (8.6E-5) (1.3E-3) (1.5E-3)
Union member 0.095*** 0.065*** 0.121*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.056*** 0.130*** 0.081**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.035) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) (0.035) (0.032)
No health problem 0.124*** 0.098** 0.108* -0.023 0.119*** 0.100** 0.144** -0.016
(0.031) (0.039) (0.057) (0.047) (0.031) (0.039) (0.057) (0.046)
Married 0.060*** 0.0014 0.0125 0.0343 0.053*** 0.0038 0.0233 0.0305
(0.019) (0.021) (0.039) (0.036) (0.019) (0.021) (0.037) (0.039)
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Motivation and Ability No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2,283 1,422 543 383 2,283 1,422 543 383
R-squared 0.221 0.220 0.361 0.415 0.244 0.239 0.419 0.448
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively5.2 Quality assurance
To identify inadequacies in estimated models, several diagnostic tests which include
testing for heteroskedasticity andspecification test are performed as follows:
5.2.1 Testing forHeteroskedasticity
Analysis using cross-section data is likely to suffer from heteroskedasticity. The
presence of heteroskedasticity will make the usual reported statistics not valid
because the standard error is not correct. Nevertheless, although the estimators are
inefficient, the OLS estimates arestill unbiased and consistent.
To test the presence of heteroskedasticity, Breusch-Pagan test is used in this study.
Under null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, the test involves an auxiliary regression
wherein the squared term of residuals obtained from estimating the earning function
is regressed on all original explanatory variables (as shown in equation 10) and
computing an LM statistics or an F-statistics from this auxiliary regression. The idea
is to see whether the residual is related to one or more explanatory variables in the
tested model.
2 2
0 1 2 3 ˆ ln i i i i i u YOS Exper Exper X             (10)
Using Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity in all OLS estimation, existence of
heteroskedasticity is shown in most of the cases, as can be seen in table 6. Therefore,
to correct the problem, robust standard error will be reported in the presence of
heteroskedasticity.Table 6. Heteroskedasticity test
Heteroskedasticity Test
Chi2 p-value Conclusion
OLS (1) 5.89 0.015 Heteroskedasticity
OLS (2) 2.13 0.144 Homoskedastic
Male OLS (3) 5.68 0.017 Heteroskedasticity
OLS (5) 0.05 0.831 Homoskedastic






Female OLS (7) 0.79 0.374 Homoskedastic
OLS (1) 13.93 0.0002 Heteroskedasticity
OLS (2) 25.01 0 Heteroskedasticity
Male OLS (3) 27.31 0 Heteroskedasticity
OLS (5) 23.36 0 Heteroskedasticity






Female OLS (7) 35.87 0 Heteroskedasticity
5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
For sensitivity analysis, I use two different approaches: changing the sample and
changing the measure of experience. I change the sample size by dropping individual
that has more one job and individual aged more than 65 years to see the robustness of
our estimates. This is done because the measure of hourly wage is obtained from
information on weekly earning and hours of work per week from all jobs, therefore
we will have some people that have full time job and part time at the same time. In
addition, I also have individual with age more than 65 years that is older than the
mandated retired age. Both groups is likely to be the ‘extreme’ which has longest
working hour and highest experience.
Another approach for sensitivity analysis is to use different measure of experience.
Rather than actual experience, I also use potential experience to see whether the
results are robust or not. Potential experience is measured by age minus years of
schooling minus five. This calculation is based on assumption that a person enters the
labor market straight after completed their formal schooling without any interruptionand that the formal schooling is started at the age of 5. The use of potential experience
is suggested by Blackburn and Neumark (1995) to reduce potential bias due to
endogeneity of actual experience. However, potential experience is also not a perfect
measure since it likely to over value the post-schooling investment, especially for
women.
The results for those two approach show that our estimate are robust to sample
change and different measure of experience. However a caution should be note in
using potential experience for young people, since it is likely to make the return to
schooling bias upward and reduce the impact of experience. All results from
sensitivity analysisare presented in appendix B.
6. Shortcoming and extensions
Although different measure of earning motivation has been applied here, they might
be not the best to capture the individual earning motivation and attitudes toward paid
job. A better and standardized measure of earning motivation could be constructed
and used in future research. Another shortcoming of this paper is that it did not
explore to the analysis of wage differential between male in femalewhich can be done
by usingwage decomposition.
For the future research, if HILDA is still conducted continuously in near future, it
would be interesting to examine the impact of career and type job expectation of
young Australian, which is available in wave 4, on the selection of education,
occupation and industrial sector of their job which is more likely to alter the
conventional return to schooling7. Conclusion
In this paper I examine the effect of earning motivation on stability of the
conventional earning function for Australian and Australian youth using HILDA
dataset in 2001 (Wave 1) and 2004 (Wave 4). Based on the availability of the data,
different measures of earning motivation are used for each period. Earning motivation
that based on the perception of gender roles are derived for the analysis in2001, while
for young Australian in 2004 the earning motivation is derived based on career and
career expectation.In addition, I also control for potential ability bias by including job
perception on job complexity and the use of ability and skill as proxies of ability
We find that a year of additional schooling is approximately associated with an
increase in wages by around 4.5 to 6 percent in 2001 and around 7 percent in 2004.
Furthermore, we find that earning motivation is more likely to affect earning of man
but not woman. However, despite the inclusion of different measure of earning
motivation, I conclude that the adjusted estimate of returns to schooling and
experience is not significantly different from the conventional earning function
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Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly
Agree
Strongly
Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly
Agree
In order to be happy in life it is
important to have a paying job 6.61 7.10 6.61 14.49 17.02 20.46 27.71 4.20 3.85 5.08 10.60 15.55 22.47 38.24
I would enjoy having a job even if I
didn’t need the money 5.41 5.34 7.88 17.58 23.28 23.28 17.23 9.24 7.93 8.54 17.39 22.38 19.54 14.98
Mothers who don’t really need the
money shouldn’t work 28.76 17.72 14.63 14.91 9.99 6.05 7.95 13.93 16.91 14.37 19.62 9.90 10.69 14.59
Whatever career a man may have,
his most important role in life is still
that of being a father
6.68 5.06 5.56 11.88 12.24 17.58 41.00 4.69 4.34 6.22 12.53 13.97 23.39 34.87
Whatever career a woman may have,
her most important role in life is still
that of being a mother
5.98 4.57 5.98 13.78 13.64 19.13 36.92 3.99 3.46 4.47 12.57 15.81 24.79 34.91
It is much better for everyone
involved if the man earnsthe money
and the woman takes care of the
home and children
36.15 18.57 10.48 14.91 8.30 5.56 6.05 19.80 17.56 10.95 20.11 12.00 10.34 9.24
Children do just as well if the mother
earns the money and the father cares
for the home and children




at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very
important
Doing the kind of work you enjoy? 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 2.46 6.26 21.92 21.92 46.76
Having a job that helps others? 0.67 0.22 0.89 1.57 1.12 8.72 9.84 19.02 24.83 15.44 17.67
Having a high status or prestigious job? 4.03 2.24 4.47 7.16 9.17 21.25 14.32 16.55 12.53 3.58 4.70
Job security? 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 2.01 3.13 9.62 19.24 24.38 40.72
The flexibility and time to balance work and family life? 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.45 2.24 2.91 10.29 20.36 20.36 42.95
Having control over the times you work? 0.45 0.00 0.67 1.34 2.24 8.05 7.83 18.12 25.50 17.00 18.79
Male Not
at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very
important
Doing the kind of work you enjoy? 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.15 1.02 1.89 9.29 22.93 25.54 38.75
Having a job that helps others? 1.16 0.87 1.16 2.47 2.76 10.89 13.79 21.34 19.59 10.89 15.09
Having a high status or prestigious job? 3.48 2.76 5.37 4.93 6.53 17.85 15.82 16.11 14.80 6.53 5.81
Job security? 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.29 2.03 3.63 9.14 21.92 22.93 39.48
The flexibility and time to balance work and family life? 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.58 2.76 3.92 11.32 22.64 19.01 39.33




at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very
important
now : Having a successfull career? 0.89 0.89 1.12 2.68 1.57 6.71 7.38 12.53 26.85 17.00 22.37
at age 35: Having a successfull career? 1.57 0.45 0.67 2.46 1.34 8.05 6.94 14.09 23.49 17.23 23.71
now: Making a lot of money? 0.67 0.45 1.12 2.91 3.36 10.07 12.53 24.61 23.04 12.08 9.17
at age 35: Making a lot of money? 0.00 0.45 0.67 1.57 1.12 10.29 8.50 19.24 27.07 17.45 13.65
Male Not
at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very
important
now : Having a successfull career? 0.44 0.44 0.44 2.03 2.47 7.26 5.95 14.51 21.19 14.51 30.77
at age 35: Having a successfull career? 0.15 0.00 0.29 1.02 1.16 2.90 3.92 9.72 22.79 19.59 38.46
now: Making a lot of money? 0.44 0.15 0.44 1.31 2.90 9.29 11.90 19.16 22.35 11.76 20.32
at age 35: Making a lot of money? 0.44 0.00 0.29 0.58 1.60 5.52 8.56 18.43 24.82 15.82 23.95Appendix B - Sensitivity analysis
Sample : Full time employee with only one job and with age 15 - 65 years
Wave 1
M a l e F e m a l e
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years of schooling 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.109*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.124***
Experience 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.035***
Experience_Squared/100 -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.064***
Union member 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.054** 0.054** 0.045** -0.035
No health problem 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.100**
Married 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.035 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012
have a paying job 1.647*** 0.008 0.009* 0.016* 1.709*** 0.001 -0.000 0.007
job no money -0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010
Mothers:no money no work -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 0.006
Father role -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.024
Mother role -0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.020
Father earn -0.013** -0.012** -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 0.005
Mother earn -0.011* -0.012** -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007
Job is complex and difficult 0.036*** 0.031***
Use many of my skills &
abilities in job
0.008 -0.002
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299
R-squared 0.225 0.232 0.250 0.228 0.235 0.251
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectivelyAppendix B - Sensitivity analysis
Sample : Full time employee with only one job and with age 15 - 65 years
Wave 4
M a l e F e m a l e
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years of schooling 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.132* 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.069*** -0.115
Experience 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.165**
Experience_Squared/100 -0.517*** -0.499*** -0.503*** -0.390** -0.425*** -0.388** -0.384** -1.057**
Union member 0.148*** 0.162*** 0.154*** 0.168*** 0.085** 0.092** 0.081** 0.245*
No health problem 0.114** 0.151*** 0.156*** 0.152** -0.010 -0.011 -0.002 0.023
Married -0.003 0.008 0.009 -0.032 0.021 0.021 0.027 0.182
Succesful career (now) 0.018* 0.018* 0.016 0.007 0.006 0.044
Succesful career (35) -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.039*** 0.010 0.010 -0.000
Make a lot of money (now) 0.026** 0.027** 0.038** 0.017 0.019 0.025
Make a lot of money (35) 0.014 0.015 0.013 -0.021* -0.021* -0.032
Job: you enjoy 0.013 0.017 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.039
Job: help others -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.023** -0.025** -0.024** -0.026*
High status/prestigious 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.015* 0.013 0.014
Job security -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.017 -0.005 -0.004 -0.068
Balance work and family 0.017 0.017 0.018* 0.001 0.002 0.016
Control over time -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005
Job is complex and difficult 0.019** 0.015
Use many of my skills &
abilities in my job
-0.019* -0.007
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 506 506 506 506 350 350 350 350
R-squared 0.375 0.433 0.440 0.408 0.445 0.448Appendix B - Sensitivity analysis
Using Potential Experience as proxy for post-school investment
Wave 1
M a l e F e m a l e
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of schooling 0.068*** 0.056*** 0.120*** 0.056*** 0.045*** 0.132***
Experience 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019***
Experience_Squared/100 -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.020*
Union member 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.080*** 0.069*** -0.022
No health problem 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.095** 0.098** 0.112***
Married 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.029 0.010 0.012 0.001
have a paying job 0.008 0.017* 0.002 0.010
job no money -0.005 -0.012 -0.003 -0.010
Mothers:no money no work -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 0.007
Father role -0.006 -0.008 0.008 0.025
Mother role -0.003 0.006 -0.016 -0.023
Father earn -0.011** -0.005 -0.006 0.003
Mother earn -0.011* 0.001 -0.002 -0.005
Job is complex and difficult 0.036*** 0.032***
Use many of my skills & abilities in job 0.008 -0.002
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2,283 2,283 2,283 1,422 1,422 1,422
R-squared 0.209 0.233 0.151 0.191 0.214 0.006
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectivelyAppendix B - Sensitivity analysis
Using Potential Experience as proxy for post-school investment
Wave 4
M a l e F e m a l e
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of schooling 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.134* 0.094*** 0.092*** -0.184
Experience 0.092*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.144**
Experience_Squared/100 -0.329** -0.260* -0.143 -0.341** -0.287* -1.294
Union member 0.126*** 0.135*** 0.147*** 0.087*** 0.081** 0.293
No health problem 0.106* 0.145** 0.146** -0.018 -0.018 0.094
Married -0.008 0.000 -0.045 0.004 -0.003 0.297
Succesful career (now) 0.015* 0.014 0.002 0.062
Succesful career (35) -0.029** -0.029** 0.010 -0.017
Make a lot of money (now) 0.024** 0.031* 0.027** 0.030
Make a lot of money (35) 0.011 0.010 -0.018 -0.045
Job: you enjoy 0.019 0.011 0.003 0.030
Job: elp others -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.021** -0.023
High status/prestigious 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.004
Job security -0.027*** -0.017 0.005 -0.078
Balance work and family 0.020* 0.020* 0.010 0.035
Control over time -0.007 -0.006 -0.016* 0.003
Job is complex and difficult 0.018* 0.011
Use many of my skills & abilities in my job -0.019* 0.002
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 543 543 543 383 383 383
R-squared 0.360 0.420 0.420 0.458
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively